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The Changing Perspectives of U.S and 
Japanese Nuclear Energy Policies in the 
Aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster 
DANIEL A. DORFMAN* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: A TREMOR 
At 2:46 PM, a tremor strikes off the coast of Honshu Island.1  
The 9.0 magnitude earthquake tears the earth apart at its seams, 
and shockwaves trigger an automatic shutdown of eleven of 
Japan’s nuclear power reactors.2  Although warned in 2008 that a 
tremor could occur in the region, it is now too late.3  The quake 
quickly dismantles its first obstacle, the national electricity grid.4  
 
* Student, Pace Law School. Thank you to Nicholas Goldstein and Adam 
Weiss for their helpful edits and guidance throughout the writing process. 
Thank you to Jay Dorfman, Rhonda Herlich, William Frish, Brittany Dorfman, 
Jennifer Frish, David Frish, Brad Lieberman, Nicholas Switach, Lynley Jane 
Reilly, Hamutal Ginsburg, and Elliot Weiss for their inspiration and support. 
 1. Magnitude 9.0 – Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan: March 11, 2011, 
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/ 
Quakes/usc0001xgp.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2012); Deadly Earthquake is 
Strongest in Japan's History, ACCUWEATHER.COM (Mar. 11, 2011, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.accuweather.com/es/weather-news/deadly-earthquake-is-strongest/ 
46859. 
 2. Josef Oehmen, Fukushima Nuclear Accident – A Simple and Accurate 
Explanation, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Mar. 15, 2011), http://theenergyc 
ollective.com/node/53461; Japan Earthquake: Evacuations Ordered as Fears 
Grow of Radiation Leak at Nuclear Plant, NEWS.COM.AU (Mar. 12, 2011, 11:43 
PM), http://www.news.com.au/world-old/japan-earthquake-evacuations-ordered-
as-fears-grow-of-radiation-leak-at-nuclear-plant/story-e6frfkyi-1226020473244. 
 3. AFP, IAEA Warned Japan Over Nuclear Quake Risk: WikiLeaks, TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/133824/iaea-warned-japan-over-
nuclear-quake-risk/. 
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At 3:27 PM, the first tsunami slams up against Fukushima’s 
massive walls.5  Tokyo Electric Power Company notifies 
government officials, and at 7:30 PM Prime Minister Naoto Kan 
declares a nuclear emergency status.6  Officials reassure the 
public this is standard procedure and no radioactive material has 
been detected.7  Then the final strike—a forty-eight foot wave.8  It 
engulfs the facility, floods the basement, and disables the 
emergency diesel generators.9 
Over the new few days, a three kilometer exclusion zone is 
established around the power plant and people within a ten 
kilometer radius zone are advised to stay indoors.10  The United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy advise their nationals in Tokyo to 
consider leaving in response to fears of spreading radioactive 
contamination.11  What looks like a scene from a horror movie is 
now a harrowing reality.  The disaster ranks as the second 
biggest nuclear accident ever—second only to Chernobyl.12  Many 
predict the area will not be habitable for decades.13 
 
 5. TEPCO Details Tsunami Damage / Waves That Hit Fukushima Plant 
Exceeded Firm's Worst-Case Projections, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 11, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110410003477.htm. 
 6. Timeline: Japan Power Plant Crisis, supra note 4. 
 7. Id.; AFP, supra note 3 (ranked only a four out of ten on the International 
Nuclear Event Scale, the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency classified the event 
as an “accident with local consequences”). 
 8. Fukushima N-Plant Hit by Giant Waves as High as 48 Feet, ECON. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2011, 12:37 PM, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-
10/news/29403378_1_power-plant-reactors-highly-radioactive-water. 
 9. Timeline: Japan Power Plant Crisis, supra note 4; Fukushima Radiation 
Sizzling at 10 Sieverts in Flooded Basement of Unit 1, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, 
June 29, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120629a7.html. 
 10. Timeline: Japan Power Plant Crisis, supra note 4. 
 11. Justin McCurry & Robert Booth, Britain Joins Countries Urging Their 
Citizens to Leave Tokyo, THEGUARDIAN, Mar. 16, 2011, 5:49 PM, http://ww 
w.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/16/britain-urging-citizens-leave-tokyo. 
 12. How Does Fukushima Differ From Chernobyl?, BBC (Dec. 16, 2011, 5:11 
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13050228 (noting that while 
Fukushima ranks a distant second to Chernobyl in that the Japanese 
government estimates the radiation released at Fukushima was one-tenth the 
radiation released from Chernobyl, Fukushima is arguably far more complicated 
than Chernobyl because six reactors were involved. Both accidents are the only 
level seven accidents in history). 
 13. Martin Fackler, Large Zone Near Japanese Reactors to Be Off Limits, 
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In the aftermath, questions emerge: Why?  How?  Could it 
happen here?  Both ends of the political spectrum voice opinions 
and sides are taken.  Some countries, like Germany, jump ship, 
abandoning all plans for a nuclear future.  Others, like the 
United States (U.S.), experience a more complicated dynamic—
the populace frightened, agencies unshaken, and a President 
eager to push forward.  Still some, more cautious, feel that the 
issue is somehow less simple, not black or white, but a balancing 
act: the future of non-renewable resources in a scientifically 
advancing world versus the potential risks of harnessing the 
powerful unknown.  The Fukushima disaster, while devastating, 
offers profound insight into the world of nuclear energy law 
around the globe, and may promulgate a foundational shift on the 
international perspective of nuclear energy into the future. 
This Comment examines the aftermath of the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster, and its impact on American and 
Japanese nuclear energy policies.  The second section of this 
Comment provides a brief history of the United States’ nuclear 
energy policy, describes U.S. nuclear policy in response to the 
Fukushima disaster, and offers recommendations for U.S. nuclear 
policy in the future.  Section three provides a brief history of 
Japanese nuclear energy policy, describes Japanese nuclear 
policy in the wake of Fukushima, and offers recommendations for 
Japanese nuclear policy in the future.  Section four concludes 
with a synopsis of American and Japanese nuclear energy policies 
and makes a prediction for these countries’ policies in the future. 
II. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY 
A.   The Atomic Age 
The history of nuclear energy in the U.S. began with a more 
purposeful disaster.  In August 1945, television sets and radios 
blared news that the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were flattened by a new kind of weapon—one that leaves cities 
devastated and ends wars without ground troops.14  Newspapers 
 
 14. J. SAMUEL WALKER & THOMAS R. WELLOCK, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, A SHORT HISTORY OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946-2009 1 (2010), 
3
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across the country declared our ascendance into the “atomic 
age.”15  Shortly after World War II ended, many scientists, 
scholars, and politicians alike suggested that the technology used 
to cripple Japan could be used for more peaceful purposes.16  
Alvin M. Weinberg, a nuclear physicist, told the U.S. Senate’s 
Special Committee on Atomic Energy that “[a]tomic power can 
cure as well as kill.  It can fertilize and enrich a region as well as 
devastate it.  It can widen man’s horizons as well as force him 
back into the cave.”17  While scientists and scholars imagined a 
world with atomic powered airplanes and personal nuclear 
heating units for the home, the U.S. government remained 
hesitant to relinquish absolute control of this new and powerful 
technology before first testing to see what it could do for the 
military.18 
As a result, six months after the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, President Harry Truman signed the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946 (also known as the MacMahon Act), the first U.S. law 
outlaying precisely how the federal government would control 
this new and powerful resource.19  While the Act did not allow for 
the private use of atomic energy, it did rule that nuclear weapon 
development and power management would be governed by the 
newly created five-member Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a 
non-military agency.20  Because the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is 
the preeminent law on the United States’ stance on nuclear 
energy, an enormous degree of insight can be garnered from its 
diction and tone. 
This analysis is informative for two key reasons.  First, the 
Act is the foundation of U.S. nuclear energy policy, and therefore, 
plays an important role in the way the U.S. views nuclear energy 
today.  Second, the Act provides insight into the early beliefs and 
 
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/ 
br0175/br0175.pdf. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1-2; see also Atomic Energy Act 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 
755 (1946). 
 20. Atomic Energy Act 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 2 (1946). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
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stigmas regarding nuclear energy, many of which are still 
prevalent today.  The strongest underlying message in the Act is 
the idea that nuclear power stemmed from U.S. military secrecy, 
and should thus continue to be kept the military’s secret 
weapon.21  The Act’s introduction supports this message with 
statements such as, “[t]he significance of the atomic bomb for 
military purposes is evident” and “[t]he effect of the use of atomic 
energy for civilian purposes upon the social, economic, and 
political structures of today cannot now be determined.”22  
Setting a tone of secrecy, the Act goes on to say, “[i]t shall be the 
policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of 
restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common 
defense and security.”23  As a result, the 1946 law did not allow 
for the commercial use of atomic energy; it did, however, allow for 
“private research” in order to “encourage maximum scientific 
progress.”24 
The federal government seemed uncomfortable relinquishing 
its monopoly over nuclear power until it passed The Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954.25  This act proudly sanctioned privatized 
commercial nuclear power use for the first time.26  Over the eight 
years between the two acts, projections for future energy 
requirements fueled a desire to master the new technology.  Even 
more important, however, was the fear that the United States 
would fall behind other countries, namely Britain and the 
U.S.S.R, in developing nuclear technologies.27 
 
 21. See id.; see also Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Robert B. von Mehren, The 
Atomic Energy Act and the Private Production of Atomic Power, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1450 (1953).  In fact, many were convinced that the United States’ dropping of 
atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was evidence of the United States’ 
military invincibility. Id. 
 22. Atomic Energy Act 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 1 (1946). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Atomic Energy Act 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (2006)); see also Todd Garvey, 
State Authority to Regulate Nuclear Power: Federal Preemption Under the 
Atomic Energy Act, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (2011), available at https://www.hsdl.org/ 
?view&did=718958. 
 26. Id. 
 27. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 3. 
5
  
260 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
The 1954 law, considered to be “the fundamental U.S. law on 
both the civilian and the military uses of nuclear materials,”28 
articulated the first laws for the development, regulation, and 
disposal of nuclear materials and facilities.29  This fundamental 
shift in policy is perhaps best encapsulated by the first line of the 
Act: “Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well 
as for military purposes.”30  In a 1953 speech, Thomas E. Murray, 
the AEC Commissioner, predicted a “nuclear power race” and 
warned that the “stakes are high.”31  A growing number of high-
ranking government officials echoed Murray’s sentiment and 
believed that a reluctance to allow privatization of nuclear 
technology would lead to the United States’ surrender in the fight 
for global scientific dominance.32  As a result, the new act 
championed a new missive: to “encourage widespread 
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes.”33  With a larger degree of control now in 
the hands of the public, however, the Act also instructed the AEC 
to draft regulations designed to protect communities from the 
potentially devastating effects of nuclear radiation.34  This new 
twin aim was somewhat contradictory, and as commercial 
demand for nuclear power grew, many felt that the AEC favored 
its promotional duties over protection of the public.35  The dual 
responsibilities of both developing and regulating nuclear 
technologies led many to question the AEC’s decision-making 
process.36  As one critic eloquently phrased the problem, it was 
like “letting the fox guard the henhouse.”37 
 
 28. Governing Legislation: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended in 
NUREG-0980, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/governing-laws.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2012). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976). 
 30. Id. § 2011. 
 31. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d). 
 34. See id. § 2210(h). 
 35. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 4. 
 36. Id. at 48. 
 37. Id. at 48-49; see also Justin Elliott, Ex-Regulator Flacking for Pro-Nuke 
Lobby, SALON (Mar. 17, 2011, 08:15 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/03/18/ 
jeff_merrifield_nuclear_energy_institute/ (in 2007, candidate Barack Obama 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
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The AEC’s next task was to craft regulations and devise 
licensing procedures that would be strict enough to prevent 
accidents, but flexible enough to encourage new discoveries from 
the private sector.38  Among the most important of these 
procedures were standards for radiation protection, methods for 
storing nuclear waste, qualifications for plant operators, and 
perhaps most critically, procedures for issuing licenses.39  The Act 
established a two-part procedure for granting licenses.40  First, 
the AEC would analyze a safety analysis submitted by the plant 
owner and, if it were deemed satisfactory, would issue a 
construction permit.41  Second, after the construction of the 
facility was completed and declared safe, the plant would be 
granted a license to acquire fuel and begin operation.42 
It is worth noting, however, that the AEC did not require a 
plant owner to submit finalized data or more specialized 
information on the safety of a facility before receiving a permit.43  
The AEC was ready to grant a permit to a facility so long as it 
had “reasonable assurance” that the plant could operate “without 
undue risk to the health and safety of the public.”44  The benefit 
of this system was to allow plant owners to begin the lengthy 
process of construction while the AEC simultaneously analyzed 
any remaining safety risks.45  The fact that private 
development,46 and perhaps other countries, were already rapidly 
developing nuclear technologies, likely only increased pressure on 
the AEC to implement nuclear power.  Soon, however, it became 
clear that the AEC’s licensing process was more focused on 
propelling the private nuclear industry than protecting the public 
 
made a similar comparison, saying that the five-member NRC is a “captive of 
the industries that it regulates.”). 
 38. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 8-9. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976). 
 41. See generally WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 9; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2296 (1976). 
 42. Id. 
 43. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 10. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
7
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from potential safety hazards.47  Outstanding safety issues could 
be concealed in exchange for promises of big returns on privatized 
plants.48  Eventually, in 1973, due to growing concerns about the 
AEC’s ability to regulate itself and in order to expedite the 
licensing process, President Nixon asked Congress to create a 
new agency with a primary focus on licensing nuclear plants.49 
After many years of deliberation, Congress passed the 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which abolished the AEC.50  
In its place, the Act established the U.S. Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA) and the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).51  While the NRC inherited many 
of the issues that plagued the AEC, it originally succeeded in 
prioritizing issues of safety over promotional concerns.52  Other 
issues, however, began to emerge.  The U.S. had become the 
leading supplier of nuclear fuel for the production of nuclear 
power overseas.53  The NRC, therefore, had a duty to prevent 
nuclear fuel and nuclear technologies from falling into the hands 
of those who might use this new power against the U.S.54  
Perhaps most important, though, was the need to address the 
issue of nuclear safety inside the United States. 
B.   Safety Risks and Fears 
Opponents of nuclear power believed that nuclear power 
posed more safety risks than it was worth, in part because 
nuclear power had not become a financial and technological 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. See STEPHANIE COOKE, IN MORTAL HANDS: A CAUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE 
NUCLEAR AGE 252 (2009). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 104(a), 88 
Stat. 1233, 1237 (1974), available at http://science.energy.gov/~/media/bes/pdf/ 
nureg_0980_v1_no7_june2005.pdf. 
 51. Id.  The Act transferred the AEC's promotional duties to the ERDA. Id.  
The Act transferred its regulatory and licensing responsibilities to the NRC. Id. 
§ 201(f). 
 52. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 51. 
 53. Id. at 52. 
 54. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
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alternative to fossil fuel as quickly as originally promised.55  
Shortly after the creation of the NRC, the “Reactor Safety Study” 
was released.56  It applied new methodologies and complex 
analysis to determine the likelihood of a serious nuclear 
accident.57  In 1975, the report concluded that a nuclear 
emergency was unlikely, and that even if an emergency did occur, 
the damage would be minimal.58  Soon, however, theories became 
reality.  On March 28, 1979, the greatest single event to shape 
nuclear energy policy occurred near Middletown, Pennsylvania.59  
Half the result of machine malfunction, and half due to human 
error, a stuck-open pressure relief valve allowed large volumes of 
reactor coolant to escape from the power core at Three Mile 
Island.60  Making matters worse, the control panel did not 
properly convey to the operators what was happening inside the 
reactor.61  As a result, the operators failed to recognize the signs 
of a potential disaster.62  The accident resulted in the release of 
approximately 2.5 million curies63 of radioactive gas, and 
approximately fifteen curies of radioiodines.64  Over a period of 
five days, 144,000 people evacuated the surrounding area.65 
 
 55. JOHN BYRNE & STEVEN M. HOFFMAN, GOVERNING THE ATOM: THE POLITICS 
OF RISK 145-49 (1996). 
 56. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY (1975), 
available at http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/7134131-wKhXcG/ 
7134131.pdf. 
 57. See id. at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/3 
mile-isle.html (last updated Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining that while the accident 
did more to shape nuclear energy policy than any other single event, it led to no 
deaths or injuries). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. A curie is a unit of radioactivity.  For a point of reference, the amount of 
curies produced by a radiotherapy machine is roughly 1,000 curies, and can 
cause serious health effects with only a few minutes of close-range, un-shielded 
exposure. Curies: Radiation Protection, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/ 
understand/curies.html (last updated June 29, 2012). 
 64. MITCHELL ROGOVIN & GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., 1 THREE MILE ISLAND: A 
REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND TO THE PUBLIC 153 (1980), available at 
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/354.pdf. 
 65. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 55. 
9
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Although the incident negatively impacted the public’s 
perception of the safety of nuclear plants, studies conducted in 
the decades that followed revealed that the accident caused no 
increase in cancer rates.66  But it was too late—public perception 
of nuclear energy would never be the same.67  While the AEC and 
NRC had believed a nuclear accident was nearly impossible, 
critics of nuclear energy earned significant public support in their 
belief that something as powerful as nuclear energy should be 
assumed to be inherently dangerous.68 
Before the Three Mile Island accident, between 1963 and 
1979, the number of reactors under construction across the world 
increased almost every year.69  Following the disaster, however, 
the number of reactors constructed decreased every year between 
1980 and 1988.70  From a public opinion perspective, polls showed 
a significant decline in support for nuclear energy, and a majority 
of citizens opposed the building of new plants.71  Eventually, the 
Three Mile Island accident incited thousands of people to take to 
the streets across the world to voice their concern over nuclear 
energy.  In May 1979, 65,000 people marched against nuclear 
power in Washington, D.C.72  In September of that year, 200,000 
people in New York City marched through the streets voicing 
their outrage over the release of radioactive gas from Three Mile 
Island.73 
Years later, on April 26, 1986, the nuclear power station at 
Chernobyl in the U.S.S.R. violently exploded, destroying the 
reactor and blowing the top off the building.74  The accident 
occurred as a result of a test in which the operators turned off the 
 
 66. Id. at 56. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 50 YEARS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (2004), 
available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-
4_ftn3.pdf. 
 70. See id. 
 71. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 56-57. 
 72. MARCO GIUGNI, SOCIAL PROTEST AND POLICY CHANGE 45 (2004). 
 73. Robin Herman, Nearly 200,000 Rally to Protest Nuclear Energy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1979, at B1. 
 74. Natallia Pinchuk, Chernobyl Timeline, WHAT IS NUCLEAR?, http://www. 
whatisnuclear.com/chernobyl/timeline.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
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plant’s security measures and then lost control of the reactivity.75  
Because they had shut off the security devices, there was no way 
to cool or contain the radiation.76  The result was a radioactive 
plume that contaminated not merely the surrounding areas, but 
spread into other parts of Europe.77  One estimate suggests that 
the level of iodine-131 released was three times greater than at 
Three Mile Island.78  Although supporters of nuclear power 
emphasized that the reactor at Chernobyl was completely 
different from the reactors in U.S. plants, and therefore, that the 
same sort of mass-damage accident could not occur in the U.S., 
opponents of nuclear power remained unconvinced.79  The new 
slogan, “Chernobyl is everywhere,” became the mantra for the 
emerging anti-nuclear movement.80  What was already a growing 
skepticism after the Three Mile Island accident was now a 
concrete fear.  A poll conducted in May 1986, found that seventy-
eight percent of people opposed the building of more nuclear 
plants in the United States.81 
After a temporary pause in issuing licenses, the NRC, in 
August 1980, issued its first license to North Anna Power Station 
in Virginia.82  Over the next nine years, the NRC issued another 
forty full-power licenses, and even authorized the undamaged 
Unit One at Three Mile Island to resume operation.83  After the 
accident, the NRC, encouraged by Congress, added a new rule 
concerning emergency planning.84  Each utility, in conjunction 
with local police and fire departments, was required to create an 
evacuation plan.85  Some states, however, such as New York and 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Scientific Facts on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, GREENFACTS, 
http://www.greenfacts.org/en/chernobyl/index.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
 78. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 58. 
 79. Id. at 58-59. 
 80. Id. at 59. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Operating Nuclear Plants in the United States, http://clonemaster. 
homestead.com/files/Operating.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 83. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 59-60. 
 84. Backgrounder on Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ 
fact-sheets/emerg-plan-prep-nuc-power-bg.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2011). 
 85. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 60. 
11
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Massachusetts, refused to assist in coming up with a plan 
because they considered their states difficult to evacuate.86  After 
adopting a “realism doctrine” in 1987, the NRC essentially agreed 
to allow the states to operate the plants on the theory that in an 
actual emergency, state authorities would help.87 
By the late 1980s, some environmentalists believed that 
nuclear power was an increasingly sound alternative to continued 
reliance on non-renewable fossil fuels, which are limited in 
supply and contribute to acid rain and global warming.88  In 
addition, new designs for plants allowed for more efficient energy 
use and less chance of another Three Mile Island accident.89  As a 
result, the NRC decided to simplify the licensing process to allow 
for the building of more plants.90  It replaced the two-step 
approach with a one-step graded approach in which the level of 
detail a plant was required to submit depended on the complexity 
of its operations.91  The objective was to stress safety while still 
providing room for flexibility to experiment with newer designs.92 
In addition to licensing reforms, the NRC also reformed 
safety standards and made new developments through rigorous 
epidemiological studies and testing.  One study conducted by the 
National Cancer Institute found no increased risk of cancer in 
107 counties in the United States located near sixty-two nuclear 
power plants.93  Another study, however, discovered a high 
occurrence of leukemia in children around the Sellafield plant in 
 
 86. RICK ECKSTEIN, NUCLEAR POWER AND SOCIAL POWER 60 (1997). 
 87. Id. at 72; see also Ben A. Franklin, Nuclear Agency Moves to Ease Reactor 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, February 27, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/27/us/ 
nuclear-agency-moves-to-ease-reactor-rules.html. 
 88. Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy, for example, is a pro-nuclear 
environmentalist group that believes environmental opposition to nuclear 
energy is “among the greatest mistakes of our times.” Bruno Comby, 
Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N ANNUAL 
SYMPOSIUM (2001), available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/2001/pdfs/ 
comby.pdf. 
 89. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 62. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 62-63. 
 92. Id. at 63. 
 93. Id. at 64. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
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Great Britain.94  Neither study was determinative and the debate 
as to the health effects of nuclear plants remains ongoing.95 
In June 1990, the NRC announced a new policy regarding 
small quantities of radioactive materials that were “below 
regulatory concern” (BRC).96  If individuals were exposed to less 
than one millirem97 of radioactive materials per year, or a 
population group to more than 1,000 person-rem per year, the 
facility could be exempted from requiring a license.97  The NRC 
legitimized the policy by saying that this would allow them to 
spend more time and resources on larger and more dangerous 
issues.98  In response, however, the NRC faced negative public 
response.99  Many felt that the NRC had forgotten the oaths it 
took in the original Act and that the “beyond regulatory control” 
policy would allow nuclear plants to dump dangerous waste at 
public trash sites.100  When the NRC held a meeting to discuss 
the policy change, the public called for the Commissioners to 
resign.  Many even believed they should be arrested for criminal 
charges.101 
The curiosity surrounding nuclear energy in the 1950s 
turned into anger and frustration.  A country that had welcomed 
the growth of new technologies in the past was unconvinced and 
distrustful of the agency that promised to protect them.102  
Largely though, nuclear power remained and licenses were 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 64. 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021i (1988) (this was done in the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which was enacted to deal 
with the earlier act in 1980 leaving questions of low-level regulatory waste 
unanswered). 
  97. A rem is a large unit of radiation.  A millirem is one thousandth of a rem 
and is typically produced by lesser radiation from an X-ray machine or 
background sources. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 64. 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Koren Geer, Regulatory Concern: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
Solution for Radioactive Waste Management, 2 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 139 
(2011). 
 100. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 65. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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granted.103  The next phase of nuclear energy policy then would 
focus less on the licensing of new plants and more on managing 
the safety of existing plants. 
C.   The Modern Era and the Nuclear Revival 
By the early 1980s, nearly 100 nuclear plants across the 
country were in full operation.104  New issues such as 
decommissioning,105 license renewal, regulation of nuclear 
materials, and risk assessment took precedence.106  
Unfortunately for the NRC, those critical of the nuclear power 
industry were outspoken in voicing their concerns.  The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has voiced “opposing 
views and sometimes sharp differences” with NRC policies.107  On 
the other end, the private nuclear power industry felt that the 
NRC’s policies and regulations represented “a serious threat to 
America’s nuclear energy resource” by undermining public 
perception of nuclear power, requiring ineffective and 
unnecessary safety precautions, and “pricing nuclear power out of 
the competitive energy marketplace.”108  Soon, the industry called 
for reform in order to “reverse the NRC’s role in accelerating the 
decline of the nuclear industry.”109 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See David Biello, Nuclear Reactor Approved in U.S. for First Time Since 
1978, SCI. AM. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id= 
first-new-nuclear-reactor-in-us-since-1978-approved; Nuclear Power in the USA, 
WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41.html (last 
updated Sept. 2012). 
 105. Nuclear decommissioning is the process of dismantling a power plant and 
decontaminating the area in order to restore it for general use by the public.  On 
average, nuclear plants have a life of about thirty years while newer plants may 
be double that time. Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, WORLD NUCLEAR 
ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf19.html (last updated Apr. 2011). 
 106. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 67-69. 
 107. Id. at 68. 
 108. Id. at 70 (discussing that some of this criticism led to the creation of 
probabilistic risk assessments, the NRC’s response to criticism that safety issues 
should be better prioritized and more accurately defined.  For example, safety 
factors did not distinguish between human and non-human malfunction when 
merely 35% of “abnormal occurrences” were due to machine-error). 
 109. Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
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Finally, in 2001, the nuclear power industry saw the first 
signs of a “nuclear revival after a slump of more than two 
decades.”110  Improvements in operator training, plant 
management, control room design, and equipment, led to safer 
and more efficient implementation of nuclear power.111  For 
example, the capacity factor for nuclear plants, or the percentage 
of time a plant is able to produce power, increased from fifty to 
sixty percent in the 1970s to ninety percent.112 The cost of 
generating nuclear electricity also dropped.113  Moreover, “the 
increasing need for power” made investors willing to stomach the 
“high capital costs of construction.”114  One major reason was that 
the United States’ energy consumption grew by about twenty-
three percent, while energy production grew by only three 
percent.115  In addition, the disadvantages of relying on fossil 
fuels such as coal and gas became harder to ignore.116  Securing 
more oil meant having to deal with politically unstable nations 
and many were willing to recognize that coal has profoundly 
detrimental effects on the environment.117 
In 2002, a group of environmental analysts argued that 
“nuclear power can play a significant role in mitigating climate 
change.”118  This position received strong support, and in 2003, a 
report conducted at MIT entitled “The Future of Nuclear Power” 
explained that fossil fuels were not the answer.119  Instead, it 
concluded that nuclear power was a viable option and called for 
financial incentives to promote the construction of new nuclear 
 
 110. Id. at 93. 
 111. Id. at 94. 
 112. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 94. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; The Economics of Nuclear Power, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, 
http://world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.html (last updated July 2012) (the power 
produced by the world’s nuclear plants would produce two billion metric tons of 
CO2 if produced by fossil fuels). 
 118. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 14, at 95. 
 119. See generally JOHN DEUTSCH & ERNEST MONIZ, MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE 
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plants.120  Although the capital costs of building new nuclear 
plants were still considered by many to be a gamble, in 2005, 
Congress passed The Energy Policy Act of 2005, which eased the 
financial burden on new nuclear construction in an effort to spark 
the nuclear industry.121  In 2009, the NRC received eighteen 
applications to construct twenty-six new nuclear reactors,122 and 
today, in the U.S., 104 nuclear plants provide twenty percent of 
the nation’s energy.123  The country was, at last, coming to accept 
nuclear energy as a safe and efficient resource.124  On March 11, 
2011, at 2:46 P.M., however, that belief was shaken. 
D.   United States’ Response to the Fukushima Disaster 
Images of explosions, massive flooding, and widespread panic 
flooded every television in the United States.  Warren Buffett 
best captured the Fukushima disaster’s impact on U.S. nuclear 
energy policy. He stated: “Radiation terrifies people” . . . “[t]he 
United States was poised to move ahead with nuclear plans here, 
but the events in Japan derailed that.”125  For many American 
citizens, portrayals of the Fukushima disaster in the media were 
enough to convince them that nuclear power is an unnecessary 
evil: forty-three percent of those polled after the Fukushima 
disaster said they would approve building new facilities in the 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58. 
 122. Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last 
updated Mar. 29, 2012). 
 123. To be exact, there was 807 billion kWh (kilowatt hours) in 2010, with 
some states benefiting more than others.  This makes the U.S. the world’s 
largest supplier of commercial nuclear energy. Marshall Brian & Robert Lamb, 
How Nuclear Power Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://www.howstuffworks. 
com/nuclear-power.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 124. Even President Obama’s 2012 budget proposal included $36 billion in 
loan guarantees for building nuclear plants. Julie Ann McKellogg, U.S Nuclear 
Renaissance Further Crippled by Japan Crisis, VOICE OF AMERICA, Mar. 17, 
2011, 8:00 AM, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-nuclear-renaissance-
further-crippled-by-japan-crisis-118272249/169632.html. 
 125. Becky Quick, Japan Disaster to Delay U.S. Nuclear Energy Plans: Buffett, 
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U.S. to generate electricity.126  Only three years earlier, fifty-
seven percent approved of new plants.127  As in the aftermath of 
Chernobyl, public perception formed quickly.128 
At the request of President Obama, the U.S. NRC announced 
it would launch a comprehensive review of the 104 nuclear power 
reactors across the U.S.129  Nevertheless, President Obama did 
not back down from his pro-nuclear stance, announcing that he 
“continues to support the expansion of nuclear power in the 
United States, despite the crisis in Japan,”130 and that nuclear 
energy is “an important part of our own energy future.”131  One 
month after the incident, forty-five organizations challenged the 
NRC’s business practices, petitioning the Commission to suspend 
all licensing activities at twenty-one proposed nuclear 
construction sites until a thorough investigation of the post-
Fukushima reactor site was conducted.132 
Most recently, in February 2012, the NRC approved licenses 
to build two new nuclear reactors, the first since 1978, one year 
before the Three Mile Island accident.133  The reactors will be 
built in Georgia at the Vogtle nuclear power plant complex about 
170 miles east of Atlanta.134  The five-member NRC voted in 
favor of the licenses four to one, with Chairman Gregory Jaczko 
dissenting, explaining that the new licenses do not go far enough 
in requiring builders to incorporate lessons learned from 
 
 126. Even lower than the forty-three percent that approved after Three Mile 
Island. Michael Cooper, Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html?_r=2. 
 127. Id. 
 128. McKellogg, supra note 124. 
 129. See NRC to Review Safety of all US Nuclear Plants, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Mar. 18, 2011, 9:03 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42148423/ns/politics-
more_politics/t/nrc-review-safety-all-us-nuclear-plants/#.TyrIqpiLMQY. 
 130. McKellogg, supra note 124. 
 131. NRC to Review Safety of all US Nuclear Plants, supra note 129. 
 132. Carly Nairn, Anti Nuclear Movement Gears Pp, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN 
ONLINE, Apr. 14, 2011, 7:12 PM, http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2011/04/14/anti-
nuclear-movement-gears. 
 133. Steve Hargreaves, First New Nuclear Reactor OK’d in over 30 Years, CNN 
MONEY, Feb. 9, 2012, 2:50 PM, http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/09/news/economy/ 
nuclear_reactors/. 
 134. Id. 
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Fukushima.135  The two reactors are expected to cost $14 billion 
and provide 2,200 megawatts of power, enough to power one 
million homes by 2016 and 2017.136  The construction costs are 
being paid through the help of a conditional $8.3 billion loan from 
the Department of Energy.137  This approval for nuclear plant 
construction suggests that the Fukushima disaster did less to 
curb nuclear development in the U.S. than originally predicted.  
It could also be a solid predictor of the U.S. continuing in a pro-
nuclear direction within the next few years. 
E.   Three Recommendations for an Improved United
 States Nuclear Energy Policy 
Nuclear power represents a practical and powerful 
technology that, when fully controlled, presents the best 
solution138 to growing energy demands in a world with 
increasingly high fossil fuel prices and a growing threat of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  According to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, nuclear power generation is expected to increase 
by an amount ranging from seventeen percent to as much as 
ninety-two percent between 2007 and 2030.139  The issue then is 
not whether to embrace or abandon nuclear energy, but rather, 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. There are surely other solutions (solar, wind, hydroelectric, just to name a 
few), but in a country with the largest overall and per capita energy 
consumption, nuclear energy poses the most realistic solution. As Max Schulz 
articulated: 
The beauty of nuclear fission is its ability to derive so much from so 
little. The energy density of nuclear fuel far exceeds that of any other 
energy source. As my Manhattan Institute colleague Peter Huber 
has noted, “A bundle of enriched-uranium fuel rods that could fit into 
a two-bedroom apartment in Hell’s Kitchen would power [New York 
City] for a year: furnaces, espresso machines, subways, streetlights, 
stock tickers, Times Square, everything—even our cars and taxis, if 
we could conveniently plug them into the grid. 
Max Schulz, Nuclear Power is the Future, WILSON Q., Autumn 2006, at 60 
(2006), available at http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.cfm?AID=917 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 139. INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY, ELECTRICITY AND NUCLEAR POWER: 
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how to maximize the efficiency of nuclear energy while 
maintaining a healthy respect for its risks.  The question is by no 
means a simple one, and the answer may prove just as elusive.  
An open forum in which to discuss the current U.S. approach, its 
weaknesses and its strengths, may represent the best approach to 
finding an answer. 
Many of the issues stemming from the discussion and debate 
over nuclear energy arise from an apparent contradiction: nuclear 
energy has the potential to provide more energy at a lower cost 
than any other energy source, but currently only provides about 
twenty percent of U.S. energy output, and costs a fortune.140  One 
of the most obvious reasons for this anomaly is the increasingly 
high price of nuclear reactor safety oversight, nuclear plant 
development, and extensive licensing processes.141  One proposed 
solution is to limit the NRC’s involvement in nuclear oversight, 
but this would be an unwise decision. 
First and foremost, one must recognize that nuclear energy 
left unguarded and unregulated has the potential to result in 
environmental and societal devastation.142  An effective NRC is 
absolutely essential to ensure the safe operation and the future 
expansion of U.S. plants.  While it is easy to point out flaws with 
the NRC,143 one fact remains: the regulations in place should be 
sufficient to ensure safe operation and construction of U.S. 
plants, and its system of operations is more transparent than in 
 
 140. The estimated cost of building a new nuclear power plant is well over $1 
billion.  Over half of that cost is related to the cost of licensing, approval, and 
other bureaucratic expenses. What does it cost to build a nuclear plant? What 
would it cost?, DEPLETED CRANIUM - THE BAD SCIENCE BLOG (Mar. 2, 2008, 8:20 
PM), http://depletedcranium.com/hope-this-works/. 
 141. Daniel Indiviglio, Why Are New U.S. Nuclear Reactor Projects Fizzling?, 
ATLANTIC, Feb. 1, 2011, 12:13 PM, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2011/02/why-are-new-us-nuclear-reactor-projects-fizzling/70591/. 
 142. For instance, the Three-Mile Island Accident, the Chernobyl Accident, 
and the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster. 
 143. The NRC has long been criticized as a paradigm for “regulatory capture,” 
which is a term that refers to the situation when an industry gains control of an 
agency designed to regulate it.  While these allegations bear some truth, it 
appears to be less an issue of the NRC’s five individual members and more an 
issue of the NRC’s organizational structure resulting in a conflict of interest. 
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many other countries.144  The issue, then, is not a lack of 
regulation, like in Japan, but the NRC’s ability to strictly enforce 
its regulations and encourage a strong safety culture within new 
and existing plants.  This is key to not only preventing disasters 
and the shutdown of working plants, but also to promoting a safe, 
open, and honest image for nuclear energy among the U.S. public. 
i.   Establish A Nuclear Development Agency 
One recommendation for the U.S. Department of Energy is to 
create a new and separate agency bifurcating responsibility for 
two seemingly conflicting goals.  Managing plant oversight, 
regulation, and licensing would remain the purview of the NRC, 
while this new agency would focus less on safety regulations and 
more on creating new and improved reactor designs that produce 
more energy, safely, and at a lower cost.  Recognizing that the 
NRC can only accomplish so much is a good first step towards 
establishing safer reactors for the present, and promoting new 
and innovative designs for the future.  By creating a new agency 
focused on the future of nuclear energy, more resources could be 
devoted to improving plant designs without fear of past failures.  
This new agency can focus its efforts on conquering the biggest 
issues regarding the cost effectiveness of nuclear energy.  For 
example, one major hurdle to overcome is the great distances 
nuclear plants are often located from where energy is most 
needed.  The farther the energy must travel from its source, the 
more energy lost in the process.  Whatever the proposed solution, 
it begins with an agency that has the time, resources, and 
objectivity to identify the problems. 
Ideally, this agency would be staffed not by policy-makers or 
politicians, but by experts in the field of nuclear engineering with 
a healthy respect for radiation, not a fear of it.  Furthermore, 
establishing a new agency whose primary goal is nuclear 
development would also allow the NRC to utilize more resources 
 
 144. The NRC has held thirty-eight public meetings, ten closed meetings, 
fourteen planning sessions, and issued dozens of decisions just this year. J. 
Patrick Coolican, Scuffle at NRC has Stench of Industry Influence Behind It, LAS 
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in the nuclear safety arena.  For example, the NRC’s Office of the 
Inspector General discovered twenty-four instances of nuclear 
plants failing to report equipment defects that could pose safety 
risks.145  However, no penalties were imposed on plant operators 
for these violations.146  By dividing and reassigning 
responsibilities, the NRC would be forced to focus on enforcing 
regulations and responsible licensing without fear of inhibiting 
industry. 
ii.   Encourage Federal Funding and Higher Level 
Education 
The U.S. federal government should encourage exploration 
and innovation by funding grants at the undergraduate and 
graduate levels to increase the number of highly trained and 
intelligent nuclear engineers in the field.147  Human error 
contributed to many of the worst disasters in the nuclear power 
industry, including Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and to some 
extent, Fukushima (in containing the damage done).148  As John 
Ricci, Manager of Specialized Technical Training at the NRC, 
poignantly said, “You cannot regulate against stupidity.”149  Both 
nuclear safety and development, then, are limited by the number 
of well-trained, intelligent individuals willing to take on 
challenges to the industry and nuclear design.  This 
recommendation is not aimed just at lower-level nuclear plant 
operators, but also at leadership.  Human error exists as much at 
 
 145. Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: 
Assessing Regulatory Failure in Japan and the United States, BROOKINGS, Apr. 
1, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0401_nuclear_meltdown_ 
kaufmann.aspx. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Funding grants result in higher costs.  However, this price should be 
distinguished from the cost of maintaining old plants.  Viewed in this light, this 
research and development funding is less of a burden to bear and more an 
investment in the future of our energy infrastructure. 
 148. See Shogo Suzuki, Fukushima and Cultural Superiority, DIPLOMAT, July 
15, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/07/15/fukushima-and-cultural-
superiority. 
 149. David Biello, Atomic Weight: Balancing the Risks and Rewards of a Power 




276 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
an administrative level as it does in the day-to-day operations of 
a nuclear plant. 
While many new reactors applied for licenses in 2010, costs 
are now on the rise and are likely to increase due to the 
implementation of more stringent requirements for nuclear safety 
and management in the wake of Fukushima.150  Licensing 
extensions for existing plants also face additional scrutiny and 
the geographical disposal of spent fuel is likely to be reevaluated 
in a new light.151  As a result, the federal government should 
increase loan guarantees to the nuclear power industry.152  
Providing these added incentives to investors would allow for 
continued exploration of nuclear energy and would likely push 
the U.S. into a phase of nuclear enlightenment not yet seen 
globally.  Currently, half of the 104 nuclear plants in the U.S. are 
over thirty years old and are operating with outdated 
technology.153  Newer plants may provide a better understanding 
of the costs and construction times for future plants, and provide 
confidence in an industry badly needing it. 
iii.   Separate Nuclear Policy from Nuclear Politics 
It would be unfair to criticize U.S. nuclear policy without 
discussing the deficiencies of the NRC.  The NRC is a five-
member commission, currently led by Chairman Gregory Jaczko.  
Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate for five-year terms.154  Three of the sitting 
commissioners are Democrats, and two are Republicans.155  
 
 150. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE vii, xv 
(2011), available at http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/documents/ 
nuclear-fuel-cycle/ The_Nuclear_Fuel_Cycle-all.pdf. 
 151. Id. 
 152. This is true even considering the roughly $18 billion authorized in the 
Energy Bill of 2005. 
 153. Steve Hargreaves, First New Nuclear Reactor OK’d in Over 30 Years, 
CNN MONEY, Feb. 9, 2012, 2:50 PM, http://money.cnn.com/2012/ 
02/09/news/economy/nuclear_reactors/. 
 154. The Commission, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov 
/about-nrc/organization/commfuncdesc.html (last updated July 11, 2012). 
 155. Karoun Demirjian, Jaczko’s successor at NRC could be another staunch 
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While the NRC refers to itself as an independent agency, it 
receives ninety percent of its funding from industry fees.156  In 
2011, the United States’ nuclear industry “spent nearly $54 
million to lobby Congress and employed twelve former members 
of Congress as lobbyists.”157  Some of the biggest supporters of 
the nuclear power sector have also been some of the largest 
recipients of campaign contributions.158 
Although the NRC’s structure may result in those with the 
most money being in the position of making the most important 
decisions, even if one supports the NRC’s decisions, the process is 
inefficient and prone to miscalculations.  Nuclear energy is too 
powerful to be a marionette to politics.  All steps forward should 
be calculated, well researched, and the implications must be fully 
understood.  Furthermore, the most undesirable effect of 
initiatives based on cash influence and excessive politicking is 
nuclear policy gridlock—or the inability, due to political 
considerations, to move forward with industry.159 
iv.   Confront the Issue of Nuclear Waste Disposal 
One of the biggest challenges to the United States’ nuclear 
energy policy has been the handling (or non-handling) of spent 
nuclear fuel.160  Spent fuel is highly radioactive and there is 
currently approximately 50,000 tons of it sitting at nuclear plants 
 
 156. Shankar Vedantam, Nuclear Plants Not Keeping Track of Waste, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44916-
2005Apr11.html. 
 157. Kaufmann & Penciakova, supra note 145. 
 158. Darren Samuelsohn, Nuclear Industry Lobbyists Clout Felt on Hill, 
POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2011, 1:42 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51 
367.html (Exelon, one of the United States’ largest nuclear operators, 
contributed to the campaigns of the House Minority Whip and the Energy and 
Commerce Committee chairman and contributed to fourteen of the nineteen 
members in the House of Representatives from states where Exelon owns 
reactors). 
   159. See, e.g., Letter from Danielle Brian, POGO Exec. Dir., to Joseph Biden, 
U.S. Vice President (Oct. 28, 2009) (explaining that in one recent case, a 
commissioner voted on a matter that benefitted three nuclear companies, two of 
which he was negotiating an employment contract with at the time). 
 160. See generally Charles de Saillan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the 
United States and Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem, 34 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 464 (2010). 
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across the country.161  Thirty-one reactors in the U.S. store spent 
fuel in attic pools above the reactor, similar to the design used at 
the Fukushima plant.162  The other seventy-three reactors store 
the spent fuel in tanks, which are located in buildings adjacent to 
the operating reactors.163  These steel and concrete reinforced 
storage tanks are designed to withstand earthquakes within a 
200-mile radius.164  However, it is not just earthquakes that have 
the public worried.  Failures of a power grid, backup generator, or 
future terrorist attacks all have serious risk potential.165  For 
example, the “Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island, 
New York estimated in 1997 that a massive calamity at one 
spent-fuel pool could ultimately lead to 138,000 deaths and 
contamination of 2,000 square miles of land.”166 
In 1982, Congress established a national policy to solve the 
problem of nuclear waste disposal.167  The Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act made the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for finding, 
building, and operating an underground disposal facility.168  The 
Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository, 100 miles north of 
Las Vegas,169 was approved to be the site in 2002,170 but funding 
was terminated in 2011.171  Many felt that Yucca Mountain was 
the perfect place for spent nuclear waste because it could be 
stored deep underground.172  Others felt that it was too close to 
 
 161. Mark Benjamin, Nuclear-Fuel Storage to be Probed in U.S. Safety Study, 
TIME (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,2060880,00.html. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-270 (2006). 
 168. See id. § 10131. 
 169. Matthew L. Wald, How Dead is Yucca Mountain?, N.Y. TIMES: BLOG 
ABOUT ENERGY & ENV’T (Sept. 12, 2011, 7:16 AM), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/how-dead-is-yucca-mountain/. 
 170. Evelyn Nieves, Yucca Mountain Looms Over Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7362-2004Oct28.html. 
 171. Wald, supra note 169. 
 172. See Stuart Rojstaczer, Yucca Mountain: A Pragmatic Solution to Storing 
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where millions live and the transportation of the nuclear waste to 
the mountain posed a serious risk.173  Because the Obama 
Administration did not provide a technical or scientific basis for 
shutting down the site, many felt that the decision was strictly 
political.174  In response, President Obama recently created the 
Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, a group 
tasked with providing another solution to the United States’ 
growing nuclear waste problem.175  In January 2012, the 
Commission released a number of general recommendations 
including finding an interim storage location for the spent fuel, 
continuing to search for another disposal site, and lastly, creating 
another government entity named FedCorp to execute the 
program and take control of the Nuclear Waste Fund.176  
Whether Congress will act on these recommendations, however, 
is another issue entirely, and, ultimately, only time will tell. 
III. JAPANESE NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY 
A.   Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Act and The Three Non
 Nuclear Principles 
Japan is all too familiar with the devastating effects of 
atomic energy.  After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
ended World War II, Japanese public opinion strongly opposed 
the building of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil.177  Soon, 
 
 173. See David Krieger & Marissa Zubia, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Top 
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however, one factor played an enormous role in distinguishing 
Japan’s nuclear energy policy from other countries and pushed 
Japan to face the increasing use of nuclear energy abroad: 
Japan’s lack of domestic energy resources.178  In fact, even today, 
Japan must import over eighty percent of their primary energy 
needs.179 
As a result, Japan’s first nuclear research program was 
established in 1954 with the Atomic Energy Basic Law.180  
Passed in the same year the United States adopted its second 
piece of atomic energy legislation, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
Japan’s law imitated many of the concepts embodied in the 
United States’ first piece of atomic energy legislation ten years 
earlier.181  The Atomic Basic Law provided strict limitations on 
the use of nuclear technology primarily for peaceful purposes and 
established the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (later to be 
reformed as the Nuclear Safety Commission).182  In an effort to 
catch-up with the rest of a world already on the brink of nuclear 
development, Japan turned to Great Britain for help in 
establishing civilian nuclear power.183  Japan’s first reactor, 
Tokai 1, was designed by the British and completed in 1965.184  
Soon, however, Japan’s energy needs outgrew the moderate 
capacity of British designed reactors and the nation turned to 
American designed reactors instead.185 
Beyond the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which supported the 
safe use of atomic energy,186 another powerful line of thought 
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influenced Japan’s nuclear energy policy, and continues to have a 
powerful influence today.187  Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles are detailed in a parliamentary resolution that were 
never adopted into law, but were outlined in a speech given by 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to the House of Representatives in 
1967.188  It states that “Japan for its part, has been firmly 
committed to the Three-Non-Nuclear principles of not possessing 
nuclear weapons, not producing them[,] and not permitting their 
entry into the country.”189  Although every Prime Minister of 
Japan since Sato has re-affirmed the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles, some government officials have questioned strict 
adherence to these principles to the extent that they interfere 
with Japan’s national defense.190  This suggested a growing trend 
from a cautionary nuclear policy to one that was more expansive 
and open-minded.  Eventually, scarce domestic energy resources 
meant increasing pressure to advance a Japanese nuclear 
renaissance.191 
By the end of the 1970s, Japan was largely capable of 
producing nuclear energy without the assistance of other 
nations.192  By the mid-1980s, Japan had improved their nuclear 
technologies and brought their plants up to world standards.193  
However, this did not prevent industry from making rudimentary 
mistakes and acting deceitfully.  In 2002, Japanese regulators 
forced Tokyo Electric Power Co. to shut down many of its reactors 
after company officials were charged with twenty-nine cases of 
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falsifying or ignoring inspection records.194  In 2004, a pipe break 
at the Mihama plant killed four workers and injured seven 
others.195  In 2005, three reactors at the Onagawa station shut 
down following an earthquake after monitors indicated the plant 
experienced shocks that would create damage beyond its ability 
to control.196  In 2007, an earthquake led to an extended outage 
at the Kasiwazaki-Kariwa plant causing considerable damage.197 
However, no accident compared to what happened on March 
11, 2011.  Prior to the Fukushima disaster, Japan had fifty-four 
operating reactors providing over forty-six gigawatts—about one 
third of Japan’s total electricity.198  One Japanese energy plan 
showed Japan intended to build at least fourteen new reactors by 
2030.199  But on March 11, 2011, that plan changed. 
B.   Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy Post-Fukushima 
On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima disaster changed 
international nuclear energy policy forever.  Two months after 
the disaster, Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered that the 
Hamaoka Nuclear Plant be shut down in response to data 
predictions of another earthquake striking the area within the 
next thirty years.200  Days later, facing public pressure, Kan 
called for a new energy policy in Japan with less reliance on 
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nuclear power, saying, “the current basic energy policy envisages 
that over 50 percent of total electricity supply will come from 
nuclear power while 20 percent will come from renewable power 
in 2030.  But that basic plan needs to be reviewed now from 
scratch . . . .”201  He listed wind, solar, and biomass energy as 
possible alternatives.202  This was a bold proposition by Kan, and 
the statement was criticized in some circles and applauded in 
others.  Masayoshi Son, Japan’s richest man said he would 
donate twelve million dollars to start a research foundation for 
renewable energy.203  Those who supported nuclear expansion, 
including business leaders and the media, criticized the decision 
as overly rash and without a good explanation.204 
Like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island years before 
Fukushima, public perception towards nuclear energy in Japan 
changed immediately.  Anti-nuclear sentiment grew only stronger 
when the Japanese government was accused of withholding 
information from the public about the true damage caused by the 
Fukushima disaster, and its failure to bring the situation under 
control.205  Public opinion polls found between seventy-five and 
eighty percent of the Japanese people to be in favor of shutting 
down all of Japan’s fifty-four reactors.206  In September 2011, 
“[c]hanting ‘Sayonara nuclear power’ and waving banners, tens of 
thousands of people marched in central Tokyo on Monday to call 
on Japan’s government to abandon atomic energy. . . .”207  One 
month later, the Energy White Paper was released and “mark[ed] 
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an explicit and official retreat from the policy of centering the 
energy economy on nuclear.”208  “Public confidence in safety of 
nuclear power was greatly damaged . . . [the government] regrets 
its past energy policy and will review it with no sacred cows,” the 
paper said.209  Since the disaster, forty-nine out of fifty reactors 
have gone offline due to safety checks or government order.210  
While there have been electricity shortages, Japan survived the 
summer without the severe blackouts originally predicted.211  A 
country that “is the world’s third largest nuclear power user”212 is 
now in the midst of re-designing a new energy future.213 
C.   Recommendations For An Improved Japanese Nuclear
 Energy Policy 
In coming to terms with an international disaster, the first 
question is often a simple one: could the disaster have been 
prevented?  Many are quick to point fingers at the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO)—its history of failure makes it an easy 
target.  Some are keener on pointing fingers at Japan’s Nuclear 
and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the agency designed to 
provide oversight and ensure safety regulations are met.214  In 
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assessing the failures that led to a global disaster, however, it is 
perhaps more revealing to discuss the big picture and begin to 
analyze the system as a whole.  No one agency or corporation is at 
fault.  Rather, each entity is flawed in distinct ways that 
combined to create the perfect storm.  Now that that storm has 
manifested, this Comment will examine the ways Japan can 
regain momentum from both a public safety standpoint, and 
perhaps, in redirecting their nuclear energy future. 
i.   End Regulatory Capture 
Japan’s Nuclear Safety Commission, similar to the United 
States’ NRC, labels itself an independent agency within the 
Cabinet of Japan and plays the central role in nuclear safety 
administration.215  Commissioners are appointed by the Prime 
Minister and are confirmed by the Diet—Japan’s bicameral 
legislature.216  The Nuclear Safety Commission occupies a unique 
cabinet position in that it is the only ordinary advisory committee 
that can make recommendations to other agencies in the name of 
the Prime Minister.217  The Nuclear Safety Commission is also 
responsible for reviewing safety inspections conducted by NISA, 
Japan’s principle nuclear regulatory and oversight branch.218 
As with the United States’ own NRC, however, NISA is not 
entirely independent.  NISA is part of Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) whose goals are to 
promote the nuclear industry within Japan and abroad.219  METI 
has been charged with distorting information on the dangers of 
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nuclear energy presented to public officials and consistently 
working to foil alternative energy legislation.220  METI was also 
influential in the “launching of the International Nuclear Energy 
Development of Japan Co. (JINED), a public-private partnership 
headed by TEPCO to sell nuclear reactor contracts to developing 
countries.”221  In response to critiques that NISA and METI’s 
relationship constitutes a conflict of interest, reports have been 
released that the Japanese government is considering splitting 
NISA from METI222—a wise decision in the wake of Fukushima. 
Another problem that stems from Japan’s system of 
regulatory capture is a practice called amakudari or “descent 
from heaven” (in the U.S. we refer to this as the “revolving 
door”).223  Japanese officials turn their heads from private sector 
wrong-doings because retiring public officials often go on to 
obtain high-paying private sector jobs.224  Nuclear regulation only 
works when regulators are entirely independent of industry.  In 
Japan, it is not unusual for individuals in the nuclear sector to 
also play roles in plant licensing, rulemaking, and inspecting.225  
For example, after retiring from his job as METI’s director 
general, Ishida Toru went on to become an advisor to TEPCO—
the owner and operator of the Fukushima power plant.226  In 
2005, when the Japanese government convened a panel to modify 
nuclear regulatory standards, eleven of the nineteen panel 
members worked in the nuclear industry.227  At worst, this 
blatant conflict of interest is likely to lead to underestimating the 
amount of damage that can be done to a nuclear plant, and 
possibly another Fukushima-type disaster.  At best, it 
undermines Japanese public perception and trust in NISA as an 
agency whose primary goal should be protecting public safety by 
ensuring strict regulations are in place and are being enforced. 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Kaufmann & Penciakova, supra note 145. 
 226. Pro-Nuclear Ministry’s Bureaucrats Become TEPCO’s Vice Chair, JAPAN 
PRESS WEEKLY (Apr. 10, 2011), http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/ 
index.php?id=1728. 
 227. Kaufmann & Penciakova, supra note 145. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/5
  
2012] CHANGING NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICIES 287 
 
ii.   Upgrade Nuclear Technology and Enforce 
Regulations 
Critiques of Japan’s Nuclear Safety Commission run parallel 
with critiques of the United States’ own NRC.  But there are also 
some flaws in Japanese policy that are unique.  For example, one 
significant area of weakness that became dauntingly obvious in 
the aftermath of Fukushima is Japan’s reliance on “older 
scientific precepts for protecting nuclear plants.”228  This is not 
just limited to nuclear plant construction, but also to evolving 
scientific data and technology.229  Since the 1980s, NISA has 
ignored warnings it received regarding the ability of reactor 
containment structures to “withstand earthquakes and 
tsunamis.”230  Only a few years ago, “a 6.8-magnitude earthquake 
resulted in 1,200 liters of radioactive water leaking into the 
Japan Sea.”231  TEPCO, the plant operator, later admitted “that 
the reactors had not been designed to withstand an earthquake of 
that size.”232  This negligence is especially disconcerting 
considering Japan has historically been prone to both 
earthquakes and tsunamis.233 
While many feel that a country prone to natural disasters 
should steer clear of building nuclear plants altogether, the very 
least NISA can do is plan for the worst and keep up with the 
technology that has changed the way safety data is calculated, 
viewed, and implemented.  Much of Japan’s nuclear safety 
regulations are based on archaic data that fail to take into 
account technological advances made since the 1970s.234  These 
methods do not take into account more devastating events that 
could occur in the future, “even though risk assessment models 
that do so currently exist.”235  Worse, NISA publishes no binding 
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regulations.236  Instead, they release only voluntary guidelines 
that leave the task of risk assessment and emergency response 
planning in the hands of plant operators.237 
One recommendation would be to completely overhaul 
Japan’s system of nuclear technologies.  In fact, days after 
Fukushima, the Japanese government said that immediate safety 
upgrades would be put into place at every nuclear plant in 
Japan.238  Ideally, NISA should not just adopt safety upgrades 
used in other countries, but completely re-evaluate what is 
needed in a country prone to natural disasters.  If NISA follows 
through on the promise, this would be a significant step in 
Japan’s pro-nuclear policies and would provide reassurance that 
Japan plans to bring its plants back online sooner than later.  
However, to truly reinstate confidence in Japan’s nuclear power 
industry, government transparency must be as strong and 
comprehensive as the physical upgrades to the facilities.  The 
general public’s confidence will have to be re-established, a 
difficult task considering the damage done. 
iii.   Suspension and Debarment of TEPCO 
One way to begin re-building public confidence is to publicly 
acknowledge the failings of TEPCO.  This is easier said than 
done, however, considering TEPCO is one of the most powerful 
and influential companies in Japan.  Furthermore, unlike in the 
U.S. where nuclear plant owners remain out of sight from the 
general public, TEPCO spends an enormous amount of money on 
advertising.239  As a result, the Japanese media fails to broadcast 
anti-nuclear activities for fear they would lose TEPCO as an 
advertiser.240  While it may be impossible to keep TEPCO from 
advertising, the media’s failure to broadcast any anti-nuclear 
sentiments can cast shadows of skepticism in the minds of the 
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Japanese public who must live in the aftermath of an unrivaled 
nuclear disaster. 
Another recommendation is to institute a sub-agency that 
has the power to suspend or debar TEPCO from working with the 
Japanese government.  For example, in the U.S., EPA’s 
Suspension and Debarment Division has the authority to prevent 
companies from participating in government contracts, loans, and 
grants.241  The Suspension and Debarment Division operates 
under the rationale that they have a responsibility to protect the 
government from doing business with companies who pose a 
business risk to the government.242  Often times, a company may 
face large monetary fines for acting irresponsibly but view the 
fine as the mere cost of doing business.  Suspension and 
Debarment is a solution to this problem because they have the 
power to prevent the company from conducting business with the 
government altogether.  The Division also serves as a check on 
the U.S. Department of Justice who may decline to prosecute an 
environmental crime.  At that point, the Suspension and 
Debarment Division can still take steps to suspend or debar the 
particular entity.  Japan can benefit by instituting a Suspension 
and Debarment program as a tool to keep powerful companies 
like TEPCO from abusing their power.  Certainly, TEPCO has 
acted irresponsibly enough over the past few decades to warrant 
an investigation into their safety and maintenance practices. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that the Fukushima Disaster has 
played a significant role in altering the course of U.S. and 
Japanese nuclear energy policies.  From the media’s portrayal of 
Fukushima burning, to the agencies abilities to react and restore 
confidence, to the millions that took to the streets in protest, 
nuclear energy policy is created, bent, and fashioned at all ends of 
society.  While the extent and causes of nuclear issues vary in the 
U.S and Japan, there are many similarities. 
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In the U.S., the NRC must make every effort to enforce their 
regulations and free itself from regulatory capture.  By dividing 
the NRC into two sub-agencies, one focused on licensing and 
safety regulations, and the other focused on nuclear development 
and encouraging industry, this goal is within reach.  It must also 
remember that nuclear energy promises a powerful and exciting 
prospect, and that even one mistake can set back any and all 
plans for the future.  Thinking forward, the Government must 
invest in the future and remember that success is only an option 
if it invests in highly trained, specialized scientists, astute 
leaders in the field of regulation, and cutting edge technologies.  
The newly licensed plants in Georgia are a step in the right 
direction, but spent nuclear waste is an issue that has yet to be 
resolved and may make or break U.S. nuclear energy policy 
moving forward.  One must not forget that when dealing with 
nuclear energy, public perception is fragile, and failure is not an 
option. 
Japan’s nuclear energy policy, unlike the United States’, is 
under the microscope, and subject to intense critique.  As a result, 
Japan has a lot to work on in the upcoming years to restore public 
faith in an industry under attack.  While the Prime Minister and 
TEPCO are perhaps the easiest to blame, Fukushima is really the 
result of many failed policies, including NISA’s lack of regulation 
and oversight.  By failing to sanction plant operators for countless 
safety violations, providing no concrete regulations, and relying 
on outdated risk assessment models, NISA has largely allowed 
the private nuclear industry to rule itself.  If Japan wishes to 
continue on a pro-nuclear path, a decision that will likely be made 
after the Fukushima cleanup is complete, NISA may be re-
organized and re-commissioned under a new Cabinet.  This re-
commissioning, in addition to regaining the public trust, is 
essential for Japan’s nuclear energy policy moving forward as the 
Japanese struggle to revive what was once a promising nuclear 
future. 
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